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Abstract 
 We estimate the incentive effects of income taxation in a life-cycle model of 
consumption and labor supply that relaxes the standard assumption of strong separability within 
periods. Our model permits identification of both within-period preference parameters and life-
cycle preference parameters such as the inter-temporal substitution elasticity. Results indicate 
that consumption and hours worked are direct complements in utility, and both increase with an 
increase in the after-tax share and with a compensated increase in the net wage. The 
compensated net wage elasticity is about 0.3, nearly double the standard estimates for men in the 
United States that ignore within-period non-separability between consumption and hours and 
rely on linear preferences. Given our estimated inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of about –
0.96, the Frisch specific substitution elasticities of consumption and labor supply with respect to 
the after-tax wage are about 0.1 and 0.5, indicating significant inter-temporal smoothing of 
utility. Depending on consumption measure, static estimates of the marginal welfare cost of 
revenue-neutral taxation are 6–20 percent, which is about half the estimated welfare cost when 
additivity between consumption and leisure is incorrectly imposed.  
Keywords: Life Cycle, Labor Supply, Consumption, Taxation, Marginal Welfare Cost 
 
 
                                                                        
 
Estimating the effect of income taxes on labor supply has been a focal point of research 
by labor and public economists for over three decades (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999; Pencavel 
1986). The keen economic interest stems from the well established result that the deadweight 
loss from reduced incentives to work is increasing in the progressivity of the tax code (Auerbach 
1985; Auerbach and Slemrod 1997; Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir 1998; Carroll, Holtz-Eakin, 
Rider, and Rosen 1999; Hausman 1981; Ziliak and Kniesner 1999). However, there has been 
much disagreement over the years on the magnitude (and sometimes even the sign) of 
compensated wage effects — a positive compensated wage effect means that moving to a 
revenue-neutral flatter income tax induces more hours worked and reduces deadweight loss. 
Moreover, much of the research on labor supply and taxation has been conducted with static 
models on cross-sectional data (recent exceptions include Blundell et al. 1998, and Ziliak and 
Kniesner 1999), and all previous empirical work on taxes and labor supply maintains the 
assumption of additive separability between consumption and leisure. A more complete 
understanding of the economic implications of tax reform requires an evaluation of income 
taxation in a more flexible framework that admits interactions among consumption and leisure 
choices over time. We exploit the natural experiments of the tax reforms of the 1980s and 1990s 
in the United States to examine empirically the joint effect of income taxes on life-cycle 
consumption and labor supply. 
The interest in identifying the impact of income taxes on labor supply was renewed in the 
1990s when MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990) challenged the seminal econometric 
framework of Hausman (1981), who had modeled and estimated via maximum likelihood the 
intricacies of the piecewise linear budget set facing the worker by a simultaneous choice of 
segment (kink) location and hours of work. Hausman’s estimates suggested that the deadweight 
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loss of income taxation was sizable, which provided the intellectual foundation for the 1980s tax 
reforms. MaCurdy, et al. (1990) argued that internal consistency of Hausman’s model required 
an upward sloping labor supply schedule, and upon relaxing some key assumptions by 
smoothing the budget set the previously accepted result of a vertical or backward-bending male 
labor supply schedule reappeared. Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) extended the single-period linear 
model to the life-cycle case and found estimates closer to Hausman’s, with a compensated wage 
elasticity ranging from 0.13 to 0.18 across wealth quartiles. The implied life-cycle deadweight 
loss from the 1980s U.S. income tax structure was about 20 percent of current income. 
Unlike labor supply, there is comparatively little research on how income taxes affect 
consumption expenditures, either independently or in conjunction with labor supply choices. 
Most of this work has focused on the consumption-smoothing aspects of distortionary income 
taxation (Auerbach and Feenberg 2000; Kniesner and Ziliak 2002; Low and Maldoom 2004; 
Strawczynski 1998; Varian 1980). Empirical work addressing the effects of income taxes on 
labor supply in a framework that simultaneously models the consumption decision has been 
nonexistent. Other empirical research has relaxed and rejected within-period separability 
between consumption and leisure in the contexts of a conditional demand model (Blundell, 
Browning, and Meghir 1994; Browning and Meghir 1991), habit-formation (Hotz, Kydland, and 
Sedlacek 1988), and endogenous human capital (Shaw 1989), but the research has not been 
concerned with income tax effects.1 Obtaining estimates of labor-supply tax effects in the context 
of a flexible framework with consumption is critical to more informed tax policy, especially in 
light of major reforms to the U.S. tax system over the past two decades and recent procedural 
changes adopted by the Congressional Budget Office to score tax revenue effects dynamically.  
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Research examining the connections among taxes, consumption, and labor supply is of 
further interest in light of the burgeoning macroeconomics literature on precautionary saving. In 
aggregate data current consumption tracks current income closely, contrary to the standard life-
cycle permanent income model of consumption (Carroll and Summers 1991). To explain the 
apparent excess sensitivity puzzle some researchers have turned to alternative models with 
impatient consumers and buffer-stock saving (Carroll, 1997; Deaton, 1991). The recent 
macroeconomics literature has ignored the possibility that in the face of unanticipated wage 
changes households may alter their labor supply choices over time to accumulate precautionary 
balances instead of forgoing current consumption if consumption and leisure are direct 
substitutes (Low 1999). The potential importance of labor supply was first noted by Heckman 
(1974) in a deterministic setting, highlighting the fact that consumption tracking income may 
arise out of anticipated wage changes as well as uncertain wage changes.  
We extend the labor supply and taxation literature by estimating a life-cycle model of 
consumption and labor supply under uncertainty with nonlinear wage income taxation and 
relaxing the standard assumption of strong separability in consumption and labor supply choices 
within periods. Unlike the conditional demand literature we estimate within-period preferences 
over both consumption and labor supply via the marginal rate of substitution function and a 
direct translog felicity function. We then estimate inter-temporal preference parameters using the 
Euler equation governing the first-order condition for the evolution of discounted marginal utility 
of wealth under uncertainty. Demographics enter the model through so-called demographic 
translating, which means that demographic variables directly affect the parameters governing 
utility (Pollak and Wales 1992). The combination of within-period preferences and inter-
temporal preferences permits us to identify both after tax share and net wage elasticities, as well 
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as inter-temporal substitution elasticities. Although uncertainty is permitted in our framework we 
do not attempt to quantify the responses of consumption and labor supply to uncertain wage and 
tax changes and instead focus on anticipated changes (Altonji and Ham 1990; Pistaferri 2003). 
Because of the endogeneity of regressors in both the first and second stages of the two-stage 
budgeting model, we use a generalized method-of-moments estimator (Hansen 1982). 
 We employ data on male heads of household from the 1980–1999 waves of the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics, which spans the major recent federal tax reforms in the United 
States from the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 to the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Our 
results indicate that consumption and hours worked are direct complements in utility and both 
increase with an increase in the after-tax share and with a compensated increase in the net wage. 
The compensated net wage elasticity is about 0.3, which is nearly double the typical estimate for 
U.S. men based on a linear specification of preferences. Given our estimated inter-temporal 
elasticity of substitution of about –1.0, the Frisch specific substitution elasticity of consumption 
with respect to the after-tax wage is about 0.1, and the corresponding Frisch elasticity of labor 
supply is about 0.5. We conclude by relating our estimated within-period preference parameters 
to the static marginal welfare cost of taxation. We find that revenue-neutral tax reforms imply a 
marginal welfare cost that is upwards of 20 percent, which is roughly half the estimated welfare 
cost if one incorrectly imposes strong separability between consumption and leisure ex ante.  
II. A Model of Life-Cycle Consumption and Labor Supply 
 The model of life-cycle consumption and labor supply we adopt is standard in that the 
consumer is assumed to choose consumption and hours of work optimally to maximize the 
present discounted value of uncertain utility subject to an asset accumulation constraint 
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(MaCurdy 1983). Uncertainty arises due to the unknown paths of future wages, prices, taxes, and 
interest rates. Inter-temporal preferences are assumed to be time separable, as are budgets, which 
rules out preference dependence over time due to habits (Hotz, Kydland, and Sedlacek 1988) and 
rules out non-separabilities in the budget constraint due to possible endogenous human capital 
and joint nonlinear taxation of wage and capital incomes (Blomquist 1985; Shaw 1989; Ziliak 
and Kniesner 1999). We do permit non-separabilities in within-period preferences over 
consumption and labor supply, which are chosen freely.2 Added endogeneity of labor supply 
permits direct, unconditional assessment of the effects of wages and taxes on both margins, 
which is not possible in the conditional consumption demand framework.  
 
A. Basic Theoretical Setup 
The value function governing the representative household’s decision problem is 
(1) 1
,
( ) max{ [ ( , )] [(1 )( ( ))]}
t t
t t
t t t t t t t t t t t tC h
V A G U C L h E V r A w h p C T Iβ += − + + + − − . 
At is the beginning of period t assets, U(⋅) is the within-period felicity function, and G[⋅] is a 
monotonic transformation of within period preferences that governs inter-temporal preferences. 
Ct is composite non-durable consumption, L  is total time available, ht is annual hours of work, 
)1/(1 ρβ +=  is the time discount rate, Et is the expectations operator conditional on the 
information set at time t, rt is a risk-free interest rate, wt is the gross hourly wage rate, pt is the 
price index on non-durable consumption, and Tt(⋅) is the household’s income tax liability as a 
function of taxable income, ttttt ExDhwI −−= , which is gross labor income less deductions 
(Dt) and exemptions (Ext). We assume that both the utility function and the tax function are twice 
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continuously differentiable. Finally, we normalize by the price of consumption so that wages and 
interest rates are in real terms. The value function 1tV +  is unknown as of time t because future 
realizations of the function’s arguments are uncertain. 
 The first-order conditions for consumption and hours from maximizing the value function 
are 
(2) 0])1([ 1, =+−′
+t
AttCt rUGE λβ , 
(3) 0])1()1([ 1, =−++′−
+t
Attttht wrUGE λτβ , 
and 
(4) ])1[( 1++= tAtt
t
A rE λβλ , 
where G′  is the first derivative of the inter-temporal transformation function, UC,t is the first 
derivative of within-period utility with respect to consumption, Uh,t is the first derivative of 
utility with respect to hours of work, ( ) /t t tT hτ = ∂ ⋅ ∂  is the marginal tax rate, and 
1
11 / +
++ ∂∂= t
tt
A AVλ  is the marginal utility of wealth.  
 Substituting for 1+tAλ  in equation (3) using equation (2) and known time t values yields the 
familiar first-order condition for an interior solution, which equates the marginal rate of 
substitution of hours for consumption to the after-tax wage rate, )1( ttt w τω −= , 
(5) ttCth UU ω=− ,, / . 
It is clear from equation (5) that the monotonic transformation G[⋅] plays no role in determining 
within-period consumption and hours allocations, so that cross-sectional data are sufficient to 
identify intra-temporal preferences (MaCurdy 1983, Altonji 1986). To identify inter-temporal 
preferences it is necessary to have panel data (or time-series or pseudo-panel data) and the Euler 
equation (4) governing the allocation of wealth over time. 
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 Most of the literature on life-cycle labor supply (MaCurdy 1981, Pistaferri 2003) and life-
cycle consumption, including tests of full risk sharing, precautionary saving, and of the 
permanent-income hypothesis (for example, Cochrane 1991; Deaton 1991; Hall and Mishkin 
1982; Ogaki and Qiang 2001), restrict intra- and inter-temporal preference parameters to be the 
same. An ex ante restriction that intra- and inter-temporal preference parameters be the same is 
costly in terms of reduced flexibility of behavioral responses to wage, price, and interest rate 
changes (Browning 1985). 
To elaborate on the importance of maximum preference function flexibility, a familiar 
parameter in life-cycle models of consumption is the inter-temporal substitution elasticity (ISE), 
which is the proportional change in consumption expenditure needed to keep the marginal utility 
of wealth constant given an anticipated one-percent change in prices. Under the standard model 
with time-additive preferences, the inter-temporal substitution elasticity is minus the inverse of 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion, )/( CCC CUU . Given the monotonic transformation in 
equation (1) the ISE is )})/((/{ 2CCCC UGGUCU ′′′+ , which will vary based on the choice of the 
function for G (Browning 1985). Moreover, consider the Frisch (marginal utility of wealth 
constant) specific-substitution elasticity between any two goods j and k  
(6) Φ+= kkj
U
jk
F
jk seeee , 
where Fjke  is the Frisch elasticity, 
U
jke  is the compensated cross-price elasticity, je  and ke  are 
expenditure (income) elasticities, sk is the share of good k in the household budget, and Φ  is the 
ISE. If G is the identity transform, and within-period preferences are additive, then 
Y
jkj
F
jk eee ≈Φ= , where 
Y
jke  is the income-constant Marshallian cross-price elasticity of demand. 
The dual assumptions that within-period preferences are additive and transform exactly into 
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inter-temporal preferences are not innocuous as they imply that the path of consumption is 
independent of the path of wages, regardless of whether wage changes are anticipated (Heckman 
1974) or unanticipated (Low 1999). 
B. A Tractable Empirical Representation 
Our empirical strategy is to adopt the two-stage estimation method of MaCurdy (1983) 
where in the first stage we estimate the intra-temporal equilibrium condition in equation (5) by 
specifying a functional form for within-period preferences that permits non-separabilities 
between consumption and labor supply choices. Given the estimated within-period preference 
parameters we construct the period-specific utility functions to estimate the inter-temporal 
preference parameters from the Euler equation (4). 
We specify within-period preferences with a direct translog felicity function 
(7) 2 21 2 3 4 5( , ) ln( ) ln ln( ) ln ln( ) lnU C L h L h C L h C L h Cα α α α α− = − + − − − − − , 
which is a local second-order approximation to any arbitrary utility function (Christensen, 
Jorgensen, and Lau 1975). Important for our purposes is that the direct translog does not impose 
additivity between consumption and leisure — a positive coefficient on 3α  implies that 
consumption and leisure are direct substitutes, or that consumption and work hours are direct 
complements. Identification requires a normalization. We chose 15 =α . Demographics are 
introduced into the model via the method of demographic translating whereby the utility 
parameters are explicit functions of demographic characteristics (xjt), such that 
0
1
, 1,.., 4
K
j j jk k
k
x jα α α
=
= + =∑  (Pollak and Wales 1992). Based on a demographically translated 
direct translog specification of intra-temporal preferences we then estimate the MRS condition in 
equation (5) as 
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(8) 1 3 4 2 3{[ ln 2 ln( )]/( )} {[ ln( ) 2ln ]/ } 0C L h L h L h C Cα α α ω α α ε− + + − − − − − − + =  
where ε  reflects unobserved idiosyncratic tastes. 
 For the monotonic transformation G we specify preferences as  
(9) 
1( ( , )) 1( ( , ))
1
t t
t t
U C L hG U C L h
σ
σ
+− −
− =
+
, 
where 0
1
J
j jt
j
dσ σ σ
=
= +∑  are the inter-temporal preference parameters permitting variation in risk 
aversion and the ISE according to time-varying demographic characteristics, djt.3 Combining the 
first-order condition for consumption (2) with equation (4) that governs the evolution of the 
marginal utility of wealth, taking expectations and natural logs, and then first differencing, the 
parameterization in (9) yields the estimating equation 
(10) 111,11,10 ˆln)ˆln(ˆln ++++++ =+∆+∆+∆ ∑ tttCj ttjjt UUdU νκσσ , 
where ∆  is the first difference operator, 1ˆ +tU  and 1,ˆ +tCU  are the estimated values of utility and 
marginal utility found by replacing jα  with jα̂  in equations (7) and (8), )(11 ρθκ −+= ++ ttt r ,  
)(ln 1+−= ttt E ζθ , and 1ln +tζ  is the time t forecast error uncorrelated with the model’s variables. 
In deriving equation (10) we exploit the approximations 11 )1ln( ++ ≈+ tt rr  and ρρ ≈+ )1ln( . If 
1+tζ  is lognormally distributed then 
2)2/1( tt ψθ = , where 
2
tψ  is the variance of 1ln +tζ , and 
( ρθ −t ) captures the tradeoff between impatience and caution, which is a key parameter in 
determining the extent of precautionary saving in augmented life-cycle models with 
precautionary motives (Blundell, Browning, and Meghir 1994). The demographics affecting the 
MRS equation, xk, need not be time varying but demographics affecting inter-temporal risk, dj, 
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must change over time, as indicated in equation (10), to have their effects identified separately 
from the constant term 0σ . 
III.  Data and Estimation Issues 
To identify the tax effects on work incentives and consumption we use household-level 
data on male heads of household from the 1980–1999 waves of the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (1979–1998 calendar years). The survey has followed a core set of households since 
1968 plus newly formed households as members of the original core have split off into new 
families. Following the 1997 survey year the PSID began interviewing households every other 
year so there are no data for the 1997 calendar year. The PSID is advantageous because it 
contains detailed information on income and household composition, and after 1979 more 
detailed tax-related data. Our data are additionally desirable because they span multiple tax 
reforms in the United States: the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, the Omnibus Reconciliation Tax Acts of 1990 and 1993, and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 
1997. Together the tax reforms of 1981 and 1986 reduced marginal tax rates across-the-board, 
reduced the number of tax brackets from 16 to four, and expanded the taxable income base. 
Although the tax reforms of the 1990s reversed the trend of the 1980s’ reforms by adding two 
new higher marginal tax rates on upper-income Americans, the tax reforms of the 1990s also 
significantly expanded the Earned Income Tax Credit among low-income working families. 
A. Estimation Sample Details 
The sample we use in estimation is an unbalanced panel treating missing observations as 
random events. By eliminating only a missing person year of data the time series for each 
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household can be of different length within 1980–1999. To be included in the sample the 
household head must be (1) a male, (2) in the sample at least five years, (3) at least 25 years old 
in 1980 and no older than 60 in the last year in the sample, and (4) not a student, retired, 
permanently disabled, or institutionalized. Focusing on prime-age male heads of household 
allows us to ignore issues associated with labor force nonparticipation. To reduce further the 
influence of possible outliers we follow the existing literature and delete person-years with more 
than a 300 percent increase or more than a 75 percent decrease in consumption and family 
income from the previous year. We also require annual nominal food expenditures (inclusive of 
food stamps) to be no less than $520 (about $10 per week) and annual nominal family income to 
be no less than $1,000 (about $20 per week). Using our four sample filters we obtain 3,402 
household heads in the 19-year sample. Because we require households to be present for five 
years, and because we invoke more detailed filters such as missing-data codes and extreme 
consumption and income changes, we retain 21,186 household-years for econometric estimation.  
All wage, price, income, and consumption expenditure data are deflated by the personal 
consumption expenditure deflator with 1998 base year. 
 The focal variables in the models in equations (8) and (10) are consumption expenditures, 
labor supply, real wage rates, taxable income, marginal tax rates, total tax payments, interest 
rates, and demographics. We measure consumption as total non-durable consumption 
expenditures. The PSID only collects food expenditures on an annual basis, and did not collect 
food expenditures information in the 1988 and 1989 surveys. Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston 
(2001) recently proposed a method of imputing non-durable expenditures in the PSID. Using 
data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) they estimated the demand for food at home 
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as a function of measured demographics (available in both the PSID and CEX), food prices, and 
non-durable expenditures. The model is 
(11) ititit
f
it eCXc ++= )ln()ln( πϕ , 
where fitc  is food expenditures in the home and itC  is non-durable expenditures. Given estimates 
ϕ̂  and π̂  from the CEX, along with data on food and demographics in the PSID, it is possible to 
predict non-durable consumption as πϕ ˆ/)ˆ)(ln()ˆln( it
f
itit XcC −= .
4 Provided that food 
expenditures are monotonic in non-durable expenditures, that the point estimates from the CEX 
are estimated consistently, and that the trends in the variance of non-durable consumption are the 
same across the CEX and PSID, using (11) produces a consistent estimate of non-durable 
expenditures in the PSID.5 Browning, Crossley, and Weber (2003) recently argued that 
imputation methods may be a fruitful approach to deal with limited consumption data. As a 
sensitivity check on the model we also present estimates based on food expenditures and an 
alternative imputed measure of non-durables consumption proposed by Skinner (1987). 
Labor supply here is defined as annual hours of work from all jobs. For workers paid by 
the hour the survey records the gross hourly wage rate. Given that the data after 1993 are still in 
the early release form the hourly wage is missing for many observations in certain years. We 
then follow a procedure akin to the PSID’s calculation of hourly wages for salaried workers. For 
workers with annual hours less than 1000 we divide annual earnings by 750; for workers with 
hours between 1000 and 1800 we divide earnings by 1500; for workers with hours between 1800 
and 2200 we divide earnings by 2000; and for workers with more than 2200 hours we divide 
earnings by 2400. Dividing earnings by standardized work years reduces so-called division bias 
that plagues wages computed as the ratio of annual earnings to actual annual hours (Borjas 1981, 
Ziliak and Kniesner 1999).  
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 When constructing annual taxable income we assume that married men filed joint tax 
returns and unmarried men filed as head of household. Adjusted gross income is the sum of labor 
earnings, cash transfers, and property income.6 Taxable income is adjusted gross income less 
deductions and exemptions. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics provides the number of tax 
exemptions for dependents taken in each year, but how we calculate deductions requires 
additional explanation.  
 Computing the value of deductions depends on the year under consideration. To evaluate 
annual deductions prior to and including 1983 we follow the convention established in the PSID. 
With information from the Internal Revenue Service's Statistics of Income we generate the 
typical value of itemized deductions based on adjusted gross income. We then calculate the 
difference between typical itemized deductions and the standard deduction, known as excess 
itemized deductions. For the years prior to and including 1983 when excess itemized deductions 
are positive we subtract it from adjusted gross income; when excess itemized deductions are non-
positive we apply the standard deduction. 
 Beginning in 1984 the PSID records whether the family itemized. For known itemizers 
we subtract excess itemized deductions from adjusted gross income and use the standard 
deduction for the men who did not itemize deductions. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
(TRA86) the standard deduction was built into the tax tables; we only need subtract the value of 
deductions exceeding the standard deduction from taxable income. After TRA86 the standard 
deduction is no longer built into the tax tables so we subtract either the standard deduction or 
total itemized deductions from adjusted gross income depending on whether the family itemized. 
 The PSID significantly improved their method of tax imputation beginning in 1980 but 
then stopped calculating household income tax liability after the 1991 interview year. We 
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approximate the income tax liability via several steps. First, using a method derived by 
MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990) and implemented by Ziliak and Kniesner (1999), we 
approximate federal income tax payments with a smooth cubic polynomial in taxable income. 
The idea is to act as if the household faces a smooth tax function, rather than a piecewise-linear 
function, and use the smooth tax function to approximate the marginal tax rate. Because the 
marginal tax rate is also a smooth and continuously differentiable function of taxable income we 
can integrate the function back to obtain total tax payments. From total federal tax payments we 
net out the imputed Earned Income Tax Credit for each year (assuming a 100 percent take-up 
rate) and add in FICA (payroll) taxes and the relevant state income tax payments, which for 
tractability we take as a proportional tax on income with the tax rate determined by the average 
income tax rate in the state (State Government Tax Collections, 1980–1999 Tax Years).7 Our tax 
imputation method coincides well with the PSID in the years in which our two methods overlap.  
 Lastly, for the demographics moderating the parameters jα  in the MRS equation (8) we 
use a parsimonious specification with the number of children in the household, the race of the 
male head, and the age of the youngest child. To maintain tractability we only admit the 
demographics in 1α  and 2α , assuming the remaining two parameters are homogeneous across 
the sample. The parallel demographics that affect risk aversion and the ISE are the age of the 
household head and the health status of the head. Appendix Table 1 contains selected summary 
statistics for the variables used in our econometric model.  
B. Econometric Issues 
 Estimation of the MRS equation (5) and the Euler equation (4) are complicated both 
because the models are nonlinear in the parameters and because the regressors are endogenous 
(hours, consumption, and wages in the MRS equation and utility in the Euler equation).8 
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Although the empirical counterparts in equations (8) and (10) are linear functions of parameters, 
we still must address endogeneity. It is possible to rearrange equations (8) and (10) into a linear 
instrumental variables framework by using the normalization 15 =α  in equation (8) to make 
CC /)ln(2ω−  the left-hand-side variable, and using the change in marginal utilities ( 1,ˆln +∆ tCU ) 
as the left-hand-side variable in Euler equation (10). The particular instrumental variable 
estimator we adopt is the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator (Hansen 1982). 
Given a )1( Q× vector of instrumental variables for the MRS equation, zit, the population 
orthogonality conditions we estimate for the first stage are [ ] 0it itE z ε′ = . The analogous 
conditions for equation (10) are 0][ 1 =′ +ititmE ν , where mit is a )1( M×  vector of instrumental 
variables. The two-stage GMM estimator we employ admits conditional heteroskedasticity 
where in the first stage we estimate equations (8) and (10) via 2SLS and use the estimated 
residuals to form the second-stage optimal weight matrix for the GMM estimator.  
In selecting instrumental variables for the MRS equation we assume that ε  is not 
autocorrelated but may be conditionally heteroskedastic. We use as instruments a constant and 
the (t – 1) values of the head’s age, the family size, the number of kids, the age of the youngest 
child, and dummy indicators for marital status, education, race, self-employment status, health 
status, home ownership, union status, industry, occupation, and region of country. For the Euler 
equation (10) we use the (t – 2) values of the variables in the MRS instrument set along with 
time dummies and twice lagged real after-tax wages, non-durable expenditures (or food 
expenditures), and hours of work.  
Because the Euler equation (10) is a function of estimated parameters from the first stage, 
it is necessary to correct the second-stage standard errors for the additional sampling variation. 
Although asymptotic approximations to the variance-covariance matrix of sequential method-of-
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moments estimators are available (Newey and McFadden 1994), we instead utilize the bootstrap 
to construct the second-stage standard errors. The typical regression-based bootstrap is a multi-
step procedure whereby the researcher re-samples with replacement the estimated residuals, 
constructs a new dependent variable as the sum of the fitted value from the regression plus the 
bootstrapped residual, re-estimates the model, and repeats the exercise B times (b = 1 ,.., B). 
There are then B observations from which to compute measures of bias, variability, or 
confidence intervals. The basic bootstrap approach is consistent under the assumptions of 
conditional homoskedasticity, no serial dependence, and non-stochastic regressors.  
When the regressors are stochastic or there is conditional heteroskedasticity as is typical 
in IV estimation, Freedman (1984) suggests an alternative procedure. Instead of re-sampling the 
residuals, one re-samples simultaneously the estimated residuals along with the regressors and 
instruments. More specifically, one re-samples with replacement from ( ˆˆ, ,P mν ), where ν̂  is the 
Euler equation residual, P̂  is the matrix of regressors in the Euler equation, and m is the matrix 
of instruments. Call the constructed information bootstrap data ( ˆˆ*, *, *P mν ). One then constructs 
the new dependent variable, * , 1ˆln C tU +∆ , from the bootstrap data (the bootstrapped residuals and 
accompanying regressors), which is then in turn re-estimated with the accompanying 
instruments, m*. Defining the vector of bootstrapped parameters estimates as b̂δ , then the 
bootstrap standard error is ( )
1/ 2
2
1 1
1ˆ ˆ( ) / 1
B B
b b
b b
B
B
δ δ
= =
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞
− −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑ . We set B equal to 1000 
replications. The multi-stage approach, in which each observation has equal probability weight 
1/N of being drawn from the discrete empirical distribution function, is an asymptotically valid 
method of bootstrapping an IV estimator and offers efficiency gains over first-order asymptotics 
(Hall and Horowitz 1995; Ziliak 1997). 
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IV. Results 
In Table 1 we record the estimates of both the intra-temporal preferences from the MRS 
equation (8) and the inter-temporal preferences from the Euler equation (10). We set the value of 
total time, L , equal to the number of hours in a year (8,760).  
[Table 1 here] 
 The estimates in Table 1 show that the marginal rate of substitution between hours of 
work and consumption is increasing in the number of children and in the age of the youngest 
child and is larger for white men. Ceteris paribus, labor supply is then higher for men with more 
children, higher for men with older children relative to men with younger (or no) children, and is 
higher for white men relative to non-white men. The parameter governing the within-period 
relationship between consumption and work hours, 3α , is positive and statistically different from 
zero, which implies that consumption and leisure hours are direct substitutes in utility. We 
explore the implications of the inverse dependence between consumption and leisure choices 
below.  
Although the p-value from the Sargan test of the validity of the over-identifying 
restrictions in the first-stage 2SLS does not reject our model specification, the test statistic from 
the second-stage GMM model reported in Table 1 indicates possible model misspecification due 
to invalid instruments. As one check on our instrument set we replaced the initial set of 
instruments with their corresponding values at (t – 2), but obtained equally weak test results. It is 
important to note that the GMM Sargan test based on a relatively large number of moment 
conditions is poorly sized and tends to over-reject (Hall and Horowitz, 1995; Ziliak 1997). Given 
that the 2SLS version of the Sargan test does not reject the over-identifying conditions and that 
the GMM variant is poorly sized, we have reasonable confidence in our instrument choice.  
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In the second column of Table 1 we record the estimates of the Euler equation for non-
durable consumption.9 The estimate of ( ρθ −t ) equals 0.07, suggesting that prudence outweighs 
impatience and that precautionary saving motives are present. The nondurable consumption 
Euler equation model suggests (weakly) that risk aversion is declining with age, but that risk 
preferences are not affected economically or statistically by health-induced work limitations.  
A. Intra- and Inter-temporal Elasticities 
 It is informative to characterize the estimates in Table 1 into terms useful for labor-
market and tax policy; namely, compensated and uncompensated wage and tax elasticities for 
within-period preferences, and the ISE and Frisch specific substitution elasticities for inter-
temporal preferences. When closed-form solutions for within-period demand and supply 
functions are not available, MaCurdy (1983) observed that it is still possible to derive the implied 
compensated and uncompensated wage effects by exploiting a result in Phlips (1974) known as 
the fundamental matrix equation. We follow the fundamental matrix equation method closely, 
and summarize it here for completeness.  
Ignoring for the time being the monotonic transformation, G[.], define the Hessian matrix 
for the utility function as H and the marginal utility of income as ttC pU /,=µ . Furthermore, 
define the price vector of interest as ],[ ittpq ω≡′ , where pt is the price of consumption 
normalized to 1 and itω  is the real after-tax wage rate. The implied income effects, compensated 
effects, and uncompensated effects are 
,1
/
/ 1qH
nYh
YC −=⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
∂∂−
∂∂
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where qHqn 1−′≡ . The values in equation (12) are evaluated at the estimated parameters from 
the MRS equation (8), jα̂ . 
Aside from the net wage effects on consumption and labor supply, an important 
calculation for tax purposes is the responsiveness of consumption and labor supply to changes in 
the after-tax share, )1( τ− , which is readily computed using the formulas in (12). There is no so-
called taxpayer illusion in our model that would cause a difference in the effect of the net wage 
versus after-tax share on labor supply. Such a difference between ˆ /h w∂ ∂  and ˆ / (1 )h τ∂ ∂ − could 
arise, however, not from illusion but from changes in the after-tax share that trigger tax 
avoidance responses not triggered by gross wage changes (Slemrod 2001).10 For ease of 
interpretation we convert the marginal effects in (12) into point elasticities.  
 The intra-temporal elasticities derived from (12) tell only part of the story because 
lifetime considerations are a critical component in evaluating tax reforms. The estimates of the 
monotonic transformation from the Euler equation for consumption in Table 1 provide the 
information necessary to construct the ISE, which uses )}ˆ)ˆ/ˆ(ˆ(/{ˆ 2CCCC UGGUCU ′′′+ . Combining 
the compensated elasticities from (12) with the ISE, along with the associated consumption and 
hours of work non-labor income elasticities, it is possible to construct the Frisch specific 
substitution elasticities of equation (6). The elasticities are complicated nonlinear functions of 
parameters. Procedures such as the delta method, although straightforward with numerical 
gradient methods, may not yield very efficient standard errors. We adopt instead the bootstrap 
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procedure described in Section 3 to calculate standard errors for both the first and second stage 
model elasticities.  
[Table 2 here] 
  In Table 2 we report the within-period and inter-temporal elasticities implied by our point 
estimates from Table 1, evaluated at the sample means of hours, net wages, non-durable 
consumption, and after-tax shares. The non-labor income elasticities of consumption and labor 
supply are 0.035 and –0.517, indicating that both consumption and leisure are normal goods. 
Note that the property income elasticity of consumption is not the same as the total income 
elasticity reported in consumption studies such as Browning and Meghir (1991).11 The 
corresponding utility-constant compensated wage elasticities of consumption and labor supply 
are 0.086 and 0.328. 
 Our estimated compensated wage elasticity of labor supply exceeds that typically 
reported in the literature and implies a sizable deadweight loss of taxation. For example, in a 
model based on linear preferences and additive separability between consumption and hours, 
Kniesner and Ziliak (1999) find a compensated wage elasticity about one-half that reported here. 
Below we explore whether the difference is driven more by functional form differences than by 
the possibility of non-separability between consumption and labor supply. Because of the sizable 
non-labor income effect relative to the compensated wage effect, we find that the uncompensated 
wage elasticity of labor supply is negative. Male labor supply bends backward. Although the 
income elasticity of labor supply is large, it is in the range of previous estimates reported in the  
literature, as is the finding of backward-bending male labor supply (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999; 
Pencavel 1986). Important for estimates of the economic efficiency of the tax system is that we 
do find an upward-sloping compensated labor-supply supply function. 
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 The estimate of the ISE at the means is about –1.0 for nondurable expenditures, which is 
consistent with strictly concave inter-temporal preferences. The estimated ISE here is similar to 
the ISE estimated by Blundell, Browning, and Meghir (1994) in their application to UK data. 
Given the ISE and compensated wage elasticities, the Frisch-specific substitution elasticity of 
labor supply is 0.54. The parallel Frisch net wage elasticity of consumption is 0.072. Our Table 1 
estimates imply that consumption and leisure are substitutes within periods, and intertemporally 
the elasticities in Table 2 confirm that with an anticipated increase in the real after-tax wage 
hours of market work increase, leisure falls, and consumption rises. 
 In Table 2 there is also evidence that increasing the after-tax share raises both hours of 
work and consumption. A 10 percent increase in the after-tax share results in a 0.33 percent 
compensated increase in consumption and a 1.3 percent compensated increase in total hours 
within a period; there is a 0.2 percent increase in consumption and a 3.3 percent increase in labor 
supply across periods based on the Frisch elasticity estimates. Unlike the uncompensated net 
wage elasticity of labor supply the uncompensated after-tax share elasticity is positive. The after-
tax share result is important for tax policy because it means that a lower marginal tax rate raises 
hours of work, as well as welfare, as indicated by the positive compensated elasticity. The 
difference between the backward-bending labor supply schedule in response to net wage changes 
and the upward sloping schedule in response to increases in the after-tax share appears to be 
driven by the fact that workers respond to gross wage changes with a strong income effect 
relative to the substitution effect. Collectively the elasticity estimates in Table 2 imply that 
welfare gains from increased labor supply and consumption are possible from revenue-neutral 
tax reforms that raise the after-tax share. 
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B. Robustness 
 We consider a number of specification checks on our base-case results. First, we reduce 
the time endowment for work and leisure from 24 hours per day to 16 hours per day. The 
assumption is that 8 hours per day are overhead or human capital maintenance in the form of 
non-work, non-leisure sleep time. We re-estimated the model in equations (8) and (10) and report 
the relevant elasticities in the first two columns of Table 3. The estimated elasticities evaluated at 
the mean values of the functions are both qualitatively and quantitatively smaller, differing from 
the base case by no more than 5–7 percent.12 
Second, we replace imputed non-durable expenditures with food expenditures as the 
measure of consumption. Food is the prevalent measure of expenditures used in consumption-
based analyses in the PSID, though more by default than choice as food may be a poor proxy for 
non-durable consumption (Altonji 1986, Attanasio and Weber 1995; Skinner 1987; Ziliak 1998). 
The property income effect for food consumption based on equation (12) is about 0.5; because 
the point elasticity involves multiplying the marginal effect by the ratio of property income to 
food consumption, the elasticity is also about 0.5 because average food spending is of 
comparable magnitude to average property income. Using food consumption leads to a 
significantly larger uncompensated wage elasticity of consumption. As in the case of non-
durables the Frisch specific substitution elasticity is positive, reflecting that food consumption 
and leisure are substitutes. Indeed, the coefficient on the food consumption-leisure interaction 
term is 15.14 with a standard error of 0.90, as compared to the base case estimate of 4.26 (0.43). 
Although our results coincide with Altonji’s (1986) estimates qualitatively, he is not able to 
reject the null of separability due to large standard errors.  The implications for labor supply 
elasticities in the case of food consumption are to cut the estimated property income elasticity in 
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half and to cut the compensated wage elasticity by about 70 percent.13 Although the qualitative 
results remain unchanged when we switched from non-durable consumption to food 
consumption the magnitudes clearly depend on the consumption measure. 
[Table 3 here]  
We explore sensitivity of the estimated elasticities to the consumption measure further in 
Table 3 by replacing non-durable consumption with another variant of non-durable consumption. 
Skinner (1987) predicts non-durable consumption in the PSID using data on food consumed at 
home and away from home, house value, expenditures on rent and utilities, and number of 
automobiles. The PSID stopped collecting data on utilities and automobiles in the part of our 
sample. We therefore use a simple variant defined in column 1 of Table 1 of Skinner (1987) that 
is ˆitC  = 1.930 ∗ Food (home) + 2.928 ∗ Food (away) + 0.1374 ∗ HouseValue + 1.828 ∗ Rent, 
which imposes linear homogeneity by suppressing the constant term and frees the researcher 
from updating the coefficients for inflation. The estimated elasticities based on Skinner’s 
consumption variant in Table 3 are dampened somewhat relative to the benchmark measure. 
Although it is not surprising, considering that the Skinner measure is narrower than the base 
case, the Skinner consumption based estimates are much closer to the base case compared to 
food consumption.  
The final robustness check we perform is to impose the common assumption of additivity 
between consumption and leisure to examine how important allowing for non-separabilities in 
within-period preferences is for key parameters used in policy analysis. Specifically, we return to 
our base-case model of translog preferences and non-durable consumption but modify the 
functional form of utility by setting 3 0α = . We record the resulting elasticities in the second two 
columns of Table 3. Focusing on the labor supply results, we estimate significantly larger non-
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labor income, compensated wage, and Frisch wage elasticities of labor supply, and a 
correspondingly smaller (in absolute value) uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply. 
The pattern of results in Tables 1 and 3 reveals something akin to the classic omitted 
variables bias problem. We demonstrated in Table 1 that consumption and hours of work are not 
separable and are direct complements. Given that consumption and property income are 
positively correlated, as are consumption and labor supply, omitting consumption imparts a 
downward (negative) bias on the non-labor income elasticity of labor supply and an upward bias 
on the compensated wage elasticity of labor supply. Allowing for non-separability between 
consumption and labor supply is important economically. Models that ignore consumption-hours 
interactions likely provide upper bounds on labor supply elasticities.       
 To explore the non-separability issue further we examined whether a similar pattern 
emerges in the standard linear labor supply model with and without consumption. Specifically, 
we regress annual hours of work on the log of the real net wage, virtual non-labor income, and 
the same demographics as in equation (8), with and without consumption.14 The linear labor 
supply model with consumption is similar to the conditional demand framework described in 
Browning and Meghir (1991) where consumption is not formally modeled as above but simply 
serves as a conditioning variable for labor supply decisions. Although the magnitudes of the 
elasticities are significantly lower in the linear case the estimated compensated wage elasticity of 
labor supply without consumption is 0.024 and with consumption is 0.02. While the 20 percent 
difference in the linear estimates with and without consumption is smaller than the difference 
between the translog and quadratic log specifications reported in Tables 2 and 3, the result is the 
same in that imposing additivity between consumption and leisure has important consequences 
for estimates of labor-market behavior.15    
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C. Implications for the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation 
 We close the results section by examining one avenue through which our results can be 
informative to discussions of tax reform. We now map our within-period estimates into the 
marginal welfare cost of taxation (MWC). The MWC measures the extent to which welfare 
changes in response to a change in tax revenue produced when a tax rate changes. The 
calculations are static and only provide a portion of the potential behavioral response to a tax 
change. The other obvious behavioral margin of interest is inter-temporal changes, which may 
include both anticipated components and the unanticipated components occurring in the case of 
uncertain tax policy. A more detailed simulation is beyond the scope of the current project but 
should be a high priority for future research. However, in the two-stage budgeting formulation 
that we use the within-period preferences, and thus the corresponding MWC calculations, are 
life-cycle consistent. 
The bulk of the econometric estimates of the welfare cost of taxation stemming from 
models of labor supply and taxes have emphasized tax reforms that are revenue neutral 
(Hausman 1981, Triest 1994, Ziliak and Kniesner 1999). Econometric research has largely 
presented so-called differential tax calculations where there is no balanced-budget spending or 
revenue effects so that the MWC reflects pure distortions of labor supply (Ballard 1990; 
Browning 1987). In contrast, much of the theoretical research on the marginal cost of public 
funds has focused on balanced-budget tax policy in which a marginal dollar of public spending is 
financed by raising an additional dollar of tax revenue (Snow and Warren 1996). We follow the 
econometric literature and focus on a transparent calculation of the marginal welfare cost of 
taxation in the event of revenue-neutral reforms (Browning 1987, equation (10)). Browning 
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defines the marginal welfare cost of taxation as 0.5
1
c
w
d dMWC
dt
τ τ τη
τ
+⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
, with τ  as the 
marginal tax rate, dτ  the change in the marginal tax rate, cwη  the compensated wage elasticity of 
labor supply, t  the average tax rate, and d
dt
τ  the change in the progressivity of the tax code in 
response to the tax reform. The MWC formula highlights that only substitution effects and no 
income effects matter for revenue-neutral welfare calculations.  
For each calculation we set 0.323τ = , which is the sample average marginal tax rate, 
0.01dτ = , which is a one percentage point change in the marginal tax rate, and d
dt
τ  equal to 
1.32, for progressive tax reforms (the ratio of the sample average marginal tax rate to the sample 
average tax rate) or equal to 1.0 for proportional tax reforms. We consider three specifications 
for the marginal welfare cost of taxation. In specification (1) we set 0.328cwη =  based on the 
direct translog MRS elasticities with non-durable consumption in Table 2; in specification (2) we 
set 0.092cwη =  for the direct translog MRS elasticities with food consumption in Table 3; in 
specification (3) we set 0.652cwη =  for the quadratic direct MRS elasticities with non-durable 
consumption in Table 3. There are six calculations in Table 4, then, three for each of progressive 
and proportional changes in the tax code. 
[Table 4 here] 
 In the base case model with non-separable preferences in the direct translog model in 
Table 4 the marginal welfare cost of an additional dollar of taxation ranges from 16 to 21 percent 
depending on whether the reform is a proportional or a progressive change in the tax structure. 
The deadweight welfare losses are sizable and suggest possibilities for welfare-improving 
revenue neutral tax reforms in the United States. Turning to specification (2) it becomes clear 
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that how we measure consumption has a large impact on our estimates of welfare loss. With food 
as our measure the MWC of taxation is a modest 4.5 to 6 percent. Specification (3), however, 
pushes the estimated MWC in the opposite direction. Imposing additivity between consumption 
and leisure yielded a larger estimate of the compensated wage elasticity of labor supply in Table 
3, which translates into a doubling of the marginal welfare cost of taxation relative to the base 
case model that relaxes separability. Models with additive preferences between consumption and 
labor supply likely yield upper-bound estimates of the deadweight loss of taxation. 
V. Conclusion 
 We estimated a model of life-cycle consumption and labor supply where the empirical 
equilibrium conditions governing the optimal interior consumption and work choices identify 
intra-temporal preferences, and the empirical Euler equation for consumption identifies inter-
temporal preferences.  
Our estimates based on direct translog preferences for within-period utility reject the 
separability of consumption choices from labor supply choices. The implied elasticities indicate 
that labor supply responds positively to (compensated) after-tax wage increases both within 
periods and across periods. Although the overall labor supply schedule within periods is 
backward bending, labor supply is increasing in the after-tax share, whether in response to 
compensated, uncompensated, or inter-temporal increases in the net of tax share. The estimated 
complementarity of consumption and labor supply, coupled with the positive Frisch elasticity of 
consumption with respect to the net wage rate, is informative for the macroeconomic literature 
on consumption and saving because it suggests an avenue for why consumption tracks income 
over time. 
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We also further clarified the scope for improved labor-market efficiency with beneficial 
revenue-neutral tax reforms. Our base-case estimates with non-durable consumption suggest that 
the marginal welfare cost of taxation is 16–21 percent depending on whether the reform results 
in a proportional or progressive change in the tax structure. Most importantly, our research has 
highlighted that imposing additivity between consumption and leisure misrepresents important 
elasticities used in evaluating labor-market and tax policies, which can be up to twice as large 
when the researcher incorrectly imposes additivity. Further empirical research on models that 
identify the insurance aspects of progressive income taxation from the efficiency cost aspects in 
the context of uncertainty in labor markets and in public policies would be the logical next step 
in pinning down the implications of tax policy more completely. 
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1.  Pistaferri (2003) is a recent exception. Using Italian data he failed to reject the null 
hypothesis of additive separability between consumption and leisure within the context of 
a life-cycle labor supply model without income taxes. The author urges caution in 
interpreting his result because “… we are using an unsophisticated approximation to 
individuals’ preferences for consumption and leisure…..In light of the large standard 
errors I do not wish to put too much emphasis on this result.” (p. 745)  In his test 
Pistaferri (2003) did not explicitly rely on consumption data as we do in this project, and 
thus our model should be a more robust framework for examining the interactions of 
consumption and leisure. In a model without income taxes, Altonji (1986) finds that food 
expenditures and leisure are substitutes, consistent with our findings, but his estimates are 
inefficiently estimated such that he cannot reject the null of separability. 
 
2.  Alternative approaches are Browning and Meghir (1991) and Blundell, Browning, and 
Meghir (1994), who model consumption decisions within the context of a conditional (on 
labor supply) demand framework. Altonji (1986) assumes within-period separability in 
consumption and leisure, but then tests separability by approximating non-separability by 
appending the λ-constant equations with cross-substitution terms. 
 
3.  Ogaki and Zhang (2001) show that introducing a subsistence consumption level into 
CRRA preferences permits increasing, decreasing, and constant relative risk aversion and 
that the flexibility of risk tolerance affects tests of complete consumption insurance. We 
experimented with permitting a threshold utility level in the G[.] transformation, but the 
threshold parameter was not statistically significant and often created problems with 
convergence. MaCurdy (1983) reported similar difficulties. 
 
4.  We use a scaled-down version of the prediction equation appearing in Table 4 of 
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2001). We predict non-durable expenditures as 
ˆln( ) (ln ) (3.6674 0.5746 ln( )) / 0.4573f f
it it i
C c cpi= − − . We are grateful to Luigi Pistaferri for 
providing us with the necessary information. 
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5.  A related method of predicted non-durable consumption in the PSID appears in Skinner 
(1987). He, too, used data from the CEX, but many of the variables needed to construct 
the broadest version of Skinner’s measure are no longer collected by the PSID. We use a 
simple variant of Skinner’s approach in the robustness section below. Ziliak (1998) 
proposed a method of imputing total consumption in the PSID by netting out saving from 
income where it is necessary first to predict saving using wealth information in the PSID. 
Inferring consumption from saving measured by changes in wealth requires an additional 
year of data for each household to construct saving and is likely to be a noisier measure 
of consumption. 
  
6.  To approximate the actual marginal tax rate facing the household we include property 
income in AGI, inclusive of wife’s earnings in cases where married men have working 
wives. For tractability we abstract from the fact that this may generate non-separabilities 
both within-periods in spousal labor supply choices, and across periods in intertemporal 
labor supply as in Ziliak and Kniesner (1999). Confronting both forms of non-
separability are areas in need of future research. 
 
7.  Details of the tax calculations are available from the authors upon request. 
 
8.  Endogeneity is not unique to the MRS-Euler equation estimation approach; a model that 
estimates consumption or labor supply directly need still address the issue of wage 
endogeneity (Altonji 1986). 
 
9.  There is an unintended by-product of the flexibility of the direct translog utility function. 
The marginal utilities of consumption and leisure are not restricted to be positive for all 
observations, which creates obvious problems when we take the log of the marginal 
utility of consumption for the second-stage Euler equation. In cases with non-positive 
marginal utilities we assumed that the person-years contribute nothing to inter-temporal 
substitution and set the difference in log marginal utilities of these observations to zero. 
 
10.  We thank Art Snow for bringing the Slemrod (2001) reference to our attention. The net 
wage and after-tax share responses also may differ because the elasticities are evaluated 
at the means of the nonlinear functions and under progressive taxation the mean of the 
net wage is not necessarily the mean of the wage times the mean after-tax share. 
11.  The formula of the point elasticity is revealing here. The elasticity is C Y
Y C
∂
∂
, and because 
the mean of non-labor income is small in relation to the mean of nondurable 
consumption, the elasticity is small. 
 
12.   With the time endowment set to 16 hours per day, some observations had negative leisure 
hours. For these observations we top-coded annual hours of work at 5740, which leaves 
100 hours of annual leisure time. We also set the time endowment at 19 hours per day, 
which did not require any top-coding of labor supply. The results were virtually the same 
as the base case. 
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13.  The magnitudes for labor supply elasticities that we find when food is the consumption 
measure are similar to others who use food consumption, such as Altonji (1986).  
 
14. Virtual non-labor income is the adjustment to non-labor income (yt) necessary to 
compensate the worker to act as if they faced the same marginal tax rate for all taxable 
income; virtual income is ( )t t t ty w h Tτ+ − • . The instruments for the linear model are the 
same as the instruments in the MRS equation (8), but with the addition of (t−1) lagged 
wages, virtual income, and consumption. The additional instruments were necessary for 
the model to satisfy Slutsky integrability; without the additional instruments the linear 
model yielded negative compensated wage elasticities. 
 
15.  Another potential source of model sensitivity in equation (8) is the omission of 
unobserved person-specific heterogeneity that affects the marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption and leisure. To investigate the potential for so-called fixed effects 
in the MRS model we estimated a first-differenced variant of equation (8). The results, 
not tabulated, indicate that the qualitative results in Table 2 remain with additional latent 
heterogeneity included, although there are some differences. In the case of the nondurable 
consumption model the compensated wage elasticity of labor supply increases by a factor 
of 5 so that the resulting uncompensated labor supply schedule is upward sloping. 
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Table 1. GMM Estimates of Intra-temporal and Inter-temporal Preference Parameters 
 
Direct Translog MRS Preference Parameters 
(Equation (8)) 
 
Euler Equation Preference Parameters 
(Equation (10)) 
 
Variable 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
1α (constant) 77.496 
(28.676) 
Constant 0.844 
(0.230) 
{0.214} 
1α (number of kids) 3.035 
(0.784) 
ρθ −t  0.070 
(0.022) 
{0.024} 
1α (race = 1 if white) 8.877 
(1.922) 
Age –0.039 
(0.035) 
{0.0004} 
1α (age of youngest child) 1.470 
(0.254) 
Health 
(work limited = 1) 
0.006 
(0.030) 
{0.035} 
2α (constant) 51.407 
(3.954) 
  
2α (number of kids) 0.822 
(0.299) 
  
2α (race = 1 if white) 2.285 
(0.425) 
  
2α (age of youngest child) 0.499 
(0.088) 
  
3α  4.263 
(0.434) 
  
4α  3.085 
(1.573) 
  
 
Sargan [dof] 
 
110 [28] 
  
138 [55] 
NOTE: Asymptotic standard errors corrected for conditional heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. Bootstrap 
standard errors from 1000 replications are reported in { }. The number of observations is 21,186 person years.  
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Table 2. Selected Intra-temporal and Inter-temporal Elasticities 
Changes in Real After-Tax Wages ( tω )  Consumption Labor Supply 
 
Income Elasticity 
 
0.035 
(0.015) 
 
–0.517 
(0.078) 
 
Compensated Elasticity 
 
0.086 
(0.014) 
 
0.328 
(0.064) 
 
Uncompensated Elasticity 
 
0.232 
(0.080) 
 
–0.468 
(0.098) 
 
Inter-temporal Substitution Elasticity  
 
−0.964 
(0.009) 
— 
 
Frisch Specific Substitution Elasticity 
 
0.072 
(0.010) 
 
0.535 
(0.124) 
    
 
Changes in After-Tax Shares ( tτ−1 ) 
   
 
Compensated Elasticity 
 
0.033 
(0.003) 
 
0.125 
(0.012) 
 
Uncompensated Elasticity 
 
0.036 
(0.015) 
 
0.083 
(0.065) 
 
Frisch Specific Substitution Elasticity 
 
0.019 
(0.011) 
 
0.333 
(0.070) 
NOTE:  The elasticities, which are based on the parameter estimates in Tables 1 and 2, are evaluated at the mean 
values of the functions. The standard errors are based on 1000 bootstrap replications of the MRS and Euler 
equations. 
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Table 3. Robustness of Elasticities to Alternative Model Assumptions 
 
  
Time Endowment = 16 
hours per day 
Food Expenditures as Proxy 
for Nondurable Consumption
Changes in Real After-Tax 
Wages ( tω ) 
 
Consumption 
Labor 
Supply Consumption 
Labor 
Supply 
 
Income Elasticity 
 
0.046 
(0.042) 
 
–0.481 
(0.087) 
 
0.492 
(0.061) 
 
–0.251 
(0.017) 
 
Compensated Elasticity 
 
0.081 
(0.017) 
 
0.309 
(0.067) 
 
0.213 
(0.021) 
 
0.094 
(0.011) 
 
Uncompensated Elasticity 
 
0.274 
(0.189) 
 
–0.424 
(0.154) 
 
2.582 
(0.254) 
 
–0.442 
(0.033) 
 
Inter-temporal Substitution 
Elasticity  
 
–0.899 
(0.010) 
— 
 
–1.038 
(0.013) 
— 
 
Frisch Specific Substitution 
Elasticity 
 
0.065 
(0.021) 
 
0.478 
(0.127) 
 
0.107 
(0.031) 
 
0.148 
(0.016) 
      
 
Changes in After-Tax Shares 
( tτ−1 ) 
     
 
Compensated Elasticity 
 
0.031 
(0.006) 
 
0.117 
(0.020) 
 
0.101 
(0.014) 
 
0.045 
(0.006) 
 
Uncompensated Elasticity 
 
0.034 
(0.016) 
 
0.055 
(0.067) 
 
0.158 
(0.018) 
 
0.016 
(0.011) 
 
Frisch Specific Substitution 
Elasticity 
 
0.015 
(0.080) 
 
0.285 
(0.043) 
 
0.005 
(0.028) 
 
0.099 
(0.010) 
 
 
 
35
 
 
Table 3 Continued. 
 
 
 Skinner’s (1987) Measure 
as Proxy for Nondurable 
Consumption 
Direct Quadratic Utility 
Function for First-Stage 
MRS Equation 
( 3 0α = ) 
Changes in Real After-Tax 
Wages ( tω ) 
 
Consumption 
Labor 
Supply Consumption 
Labor 
Supply 
 
Income Elasticity 
 
0.102 
(0.008) 
 
–0.191 
(0.014) 
 
0.036 
(0.044) 
 
–0.781 
(0.200) 
 
Compensated Elasticity 
 
0.134 
(0.006) 
 
0.220 
(0.017) 
 
0.128 
(0.080) 
 
0.652 
(0.443) 
 
Uncompensated Elasticity 
 
0.671 
(0.023) 
 
–0.313 
(0.025) 
 
0.270 
(0.260) 
 
–0.157 
(0.492) 
 
Inter-temporal Substitution 
Elasticity  
 
–0.859 
(0.191) 
— 
 
–0.725 
(0.004) 
— 
 
Frisch Specific Substitution 
Elasticity 
 
0.120 
(0.006) 
 
0.246 
(0.019) 
 
0.112 
(0.058) 
 
1.004 
(0.655) 
      
 
Changes in After-Tax Shares 
( tτ−1 ) 
     
 
Compensated Elasticity 
 
0.075 
(0.005) 
 
0.123 
(0.017) 
 
0.036 
(0.007) 
 
0.180 
(0.026) 
 
Uncompensated Elasticity 
 
0.092 
(0.006) 
 
0.093 
(0.017) 
 
0.038 
(0.080) 
 
0.137 
(0.443) 
 
Frisch Specific Substitution 
Elasticity 
 
0.061 
(0.006) 
 
0.150 
(0.009) 
 
0.019 
(0.036) 
 
0.533 
(0.253) 
NOTE:  The elasticities are evaluated at the mean values of the functions. The standard errors are based on 1000 
bootstrap replications of the MRS and Euler equations. 
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Table 4. Alternative Estimates of the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation for Revenue-
Neutral Tax Reforms  
(Percent) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Progressive Tax:  
1.32d
dt
τ
=  
 20.9 
(4.1) 
5.9 
(0.73) 
 
41.7 
(28.3) 
     
Proportional Tax: 
1d
dt
τ
=  
 15.9 
(3.1) 
4.5 
(0.56) 
 
31.6 
(21.4) 
     
NOTE:  All estimates are based on equation (10) in Browning (1987) where the marginal welfare cost  
of taxation is 0.5
1
c
w
d dMWC
dt
τ τ τη
τ
+⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
, with τ  as the marginal tax rate, dτ  the change in the marginal  
tax rate, cwη  the compensated wage elasticity of labor supply, t  the average tax rate, and 
d
dt
τ  the change  
in the progressivity of the tax code in response to the tax reform. For each calculation we set 323.0=τ ,  
0.01dτ = , and d
dt
τ  equal to 1.32 for progressive tax reforms (the ratio of the sample average marginal tax  
rate to the sample average tax rate) or equal to 1.0 for proportional tax reforms. In specification (1) we set  
328.0=cwη  based on the direct translog MRS elasticities with nondurable consumption in Table 2, in  
specification (2) we set 092.0=cwη  for the direct translog MRS elasticities with food consumption in  
Table 3, and in specification (3) we set 0.652cwη =  for the quadratic direct MRS elasticities with nondurable 
consumption in Table 3. The standard errors are based on 1000 bootstrap replications of the MRS and Euler 
equations. 
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Appendix Table 1. Selected Summary Statistics 
   
 Mean Standard Deviation 
 
Non-durable Expenditures 
 
48.775 
 
168.231 
Annual Hours of Work 2.241 0.575 
After-Tax Wage 12.478 7.940 
Total Marginal Tax Rate 0.323 0.088 
After-Tax Interest Rate 0.005 0.015 
Age 38.024 6.548 
Family Size 3.573 1.388 
Number of Children 1.464 1.216 
Age of Youngest Child 4.930 5.136 
Marital Status (=1 if married) 0.878 0.327 
Health (= 1 if work limited) 0.071 0.257 
Race (= 1 if white) 0.749 0.433 
Less Than High School 0.186 0.389 
High School Graduate 0.312 0.463 
More Than High School 0.503 0.500 
Self Employed 0.133 0.339 
Home Owner 0.746 0.435 
Union Member 0.244 0.430 
Live in North East 0.173 0.378 
Live in North Central 0.242 0.428 
Live in South 0.405 0.491 
Live in West 0.179 0.384 
 
All income and price data are in real (1998) 
dollars using the personal consumption 
expenditure deflator. 
 
Number of Person Years = 21,186 
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